fix(security): enforce VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB on all audio paths (#53561)

Signed-off-by: jperezde <jperezde@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Juan Pérez de Algaba
2026-08-24 21:37:02 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 23ab0cfdbc
commit 0d7d5ed0b2
4 changed files with 27 additions and 5 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ denial of service:
| --- | --- | --- |
| `VLLM_MAX_MEDIA_DOWNLOAD_SIZE_MB` | `256` | Maximum size in MB for a single remote media response. Oversized responses are rejected while streaming before the full body is materialized in memory. |
| `VLLM_MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS` | `178956970` (~179M pixels) | Maximum decoded image size in pixels. Images exceeding this are rejected before raster memory is allocated. Default matches PIL's built-in 2x decompression-bomb threshold (~680 MB for RGB). |
| `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB` | `25` | Maximum filesize in MB for a single audio file. |
| `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB` | `25` | Maximum compressed filesize in MB for a single audio file. Enforced on all audio inputs (multimodal chat URLs, speech-to-text uploads, data: URLs, and local file paths) before decoding begins. |
| `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S` | `600` | Maximum decoded audio duration in seconds. Prevents compressed audio from expanding into gigabytes of float32 PCM. |
| `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_BYTES` | `268435456` (256 MiB) | Maximum float32 PCM bytes that audio decoding may allocate. Guards against sample-rate forgery where an inflated header sample rate bypasses the duration guard while the actual frame count causes a multi-GiB allocation. |