fix(security): prevent image decompression bomb OOM denial of service (#47010)

Signed-off-by: jperezde <jperezde@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Juan Pérez de Algaba
2026-06-30 09:39:22 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 06fae69114
commit 364ee36af1
7 changed files with 115 additions and 12 deletions
+15
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@@ -85,6 +85,21 @@ significantly reduce the attack surface for these types of abuse.
Also, consider setting `VLLM_MEDIA_URL_ALLOW_REDIRECTS=0` to prevent HTTP
redirects from being followed to bypass domain restrictions.
### 5. **Restrict Media Decode Sizes:**
Compressed media files can expand into gigabytes of memory during decoding. vLLM
enforces decode-size limits to prevent out-of-memory denial of service:
| Environment Variable | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `VLLM_MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS` | `178956970` (~179M pixels) | Maximum decoded image size in pixels. Images exceeding this are rejected before raster memory is allocated. Default matches PIL's built-in 2x decompression-bomb threshold (~680 MB for RGB). |
| `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB` | `25` | Maximum filesize in MB for a single audio file. |
| `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S` | `600` | Maximum decoded audio duration in seconds. Prevents compressed audio from expanding into gigabytes of float32 PCM. |
Setting any of these to `0` disables the corresponding limit. This is **not
recommended** for deployments exposed to untrusted users, as it removes the
protection against resource-exhaustion attacks.
## Security and Firewalls: Protecting Exposed vLLM Systems
While vLLM is designed to allow unsafe network services to be isolated to