[Bugfix][Security] Bound embedding densification before to_dense() (#54632)

Signed-off-by: lzhan011 <35493221+lzhan011@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Cyrus Leung <tlleungac@connect.ust.hk>
This commit is contained in:
lzhan011
2026-09-01 08:45:14 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Cyrus Leung
parent 8905633687
commit ce7391712b
8 changed files with 226 additions and 18 deletions
+47 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright contributors to the vLLM project
"""
Thread-safe wrapper for sparse tensor invariant validation.
Safe deserialization helpers for client-supplied embedding tensors.
`check_sparse_tensor_invariants_threadsafe()` is a thread-safe wrapper for
sparse tensor invariant validation. `safe_to_dense()` bounds the memory a
deserialized tensor may allocate when densified.
PyTorch's `torch.sparse.check_sparse_tensor_invariants()` context manager
manipulates a **process-global** flag (save/enable/restore). When multiple
@@ -18,6 +22,10 @@ import threading
import torch
import vllm.envs as envs
from vllm.exceptions import VLLMValidationError
from vllm.utils.mem_constants import MiB_bytes
_SPARSE_LOAD_LOCK = threading.Lock()
@@ -25,3 +33,41 @@ _SPARSE_LOAD_LOCK = threading.Lock()
def check_sparse_tensor_invariants_threadsafe():
with _SPARSE_LOAD_LOCK, torch.sparse.check_sparse_tensor_invariants():
yield
def safe_to_dense(tensor: object, *, parameter: str) -> torch.Tensor:
"""Densify a client-supplied embedding tensor within a memory budget.
`torch.load(..., weights_only=True)` prevents arbitrary code execution but
not memory amplification: a sparse COO tensor carries its own declared
shape, so the dense allocation is bounded by that shape rather than by the
request. A 2.6 KB payload declaring `(30000, 30000)` materializes 3.4 GiB,
and the shape can be picked to fit whatever host is being targeted. The
invariant checks only reject *invalid* tensors (indices outside the
declared shape); a single non-zero element inside a `(2**20, 2**20)` shape
is perfectly valid and passes them.
So reject oversized payloads based on the dense size they declare, before
`to_dense()` allocates anything.
"""
if not isinstance(tensor, torch.Tensor):
raise VLLMValidationError(
f"`{parameter}` payload did not deserialize to a torch.Tensor.",
parameter=parameter,
)
max_bytes = envs.VLLM_MAX_EMBED_DECODE_BYTES
if max_bytes > 0:
dense_bytes = tensor.numel() * tensor.element_size()
if dense_bytes > max_bytes:
raise VLLMValidationError(
f"`{parameter}` declares shape {tuple(tensor.shape)}, which "
f"would allocate {dense_bytes} bytes "
f"({dense_bytes / MiB_bytes:.0f} MiB) once densified, "
f"exceeding the {max_bytes} byte limit. Set "
f"VLLM_MAX_EMBED_DECODE_BYTES to increase this limit.",
parameter=parameter,
value=dense_bytes,
)
return tensor.to_dense()